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ALANA	VINCENT		
	
Asher	Lev	at	the	Israel	Museum:	
Stereotyping	Art	and	Craft	
 
In Chaim Potok’s novel, My Name is Asher Lev, there is a scene in which the eponymous 
protagonist, searching for some means by which to reconcile his drive to create art with his 
Jewish heritage, visits the Jewish Museum in New York City. There, he sees:  
 
Torah crowns, Torah pointers, Torah covers, spice boxes, illuminated manuscripts. Some were 
very fine pieces of work. But there was no art. It was all crafts and unmoving. I felt vaguely 
betrayed.1 
What Asher describes is a standard staple of Jewish museum collections the world over. At 
the New York museum—and, incidentally, at the Israel Museum, where I have most recently 
been conducting research—such artefacts can now be found in the portion of the collection 
dedicated to “Jewish Life”, and a corresponding collection of “Jewish Art”, containing the 
sort of artefacts that young Asher might have been happier to see, exists elsewhere in the 
building; at other museums, such as the Jewish Museum Berlin, the collection as a whole is 
dominated by the “unmoving crafts” that Asher complains of. The labels attached to such 
items vary, seemingly without rhyme or reason, even within the same collection. The Israel 
Museum describes its “Torah crowns, Torah pointers, Torah covers, etc.” variously as: “finely 
crafted objects”, “ritual objects”, “ritual utensils”, —“ceremonial objects”, “decorative 
objects”, exhibits of “artistry”, “imaginative artworks”, “ceremonial art”, “designs”, or even 
the catch-all “works”.2 In my analysis of the collection’s labelling, I could find no underlying 
                                                 
1 Chaim Potok, My Name is Asher Lev (London: Penguin, 1974), 245.  
2 Thanks to the generous support offered by the Barbro Osher Pro Suecia Foundation, I was able to visit the 
Israel Museum to study its collections on multiple occasions during my time as the Barbro Osher Fellow in 
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logic to the various descriptions; neither geography, period, type of object, or technique 
appear to determine whether an item in the collection is a “ritual object” or “ceremonial art”. 
Both the Israel Museum’s apparent inability to proffer a consistent description of the 
contents of its collection and Asher Lev’s sense of betrayal at the contents of the New York 
Jewish Museum stem from a narrative about Jewish material production which has been 
entrenched, unquestioned, enforced from both inside and outside of the Jewish community. 
As firmly entrenched as this narrative is, however, it is not a simple, value-neutral description 
of the natural relationship between Judaism and materiality. Kalman Bland’s landmark book, 
The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual has 
conclusively demonstrated that assumptions of Judaism’s hostility to images—and, by 
extension, to art—are grounded in the late 18th century, rather than the dawn of time, owing 
more to Kant than to Kohelet.3 In that book, Bland’s focus on intellectual history rather than 
material history, on written texts rather than artefacts, causes him to mostly overlook the 
strong Jewish craft tradition, which flourished even through the period in which aniconism 
became a taken-for-granted Jewish value, producing the sort of objects which Asher Lev 
deplored. However, this oversight does not damage Bland’s argument. Rather, as I show in 
this essay, Jewish craftwork during this period has been glorified precisely as an extension of 
the narrative of Jewish aniconism.  
Potok writes Asher Lev speaking at the intersection of two problematic discourses: he 
takes for granted both the religious-cultural narrative, which insists that because of the second 
commandment’s prohibition against images, Jews do not make art, and also the culturally 
entrenched distinction between art and craft, which opens up the possibility of craft as an 
alternative, acceptable form of Jewish material production. This narrative insists, albeit 
implicitly, that most artefacts of Jewish material production which might appear to violate the 
commandment against graven images, or any of its Rabbinic interpretations, are simply craft 
intended to support the devotional system of Jewish religious life. Therefore their production 
is governed by a different set of rules to those found in Torah, Talmud, or any of the medieval 
or modern halakhic sources, which apply only to material production that lacks the immediate 
practical function of craftwork. For example, Russell Jacoby is critical of scholarship that 
                                                                                                                                                        
Memory of Krister Stendahl at the Swedish Theological Institute, during the 2010–2011 academic year. The set 
of visits in which I paid specific attention to the labelling of objects in the Jewish Life collection occurred in 
March and April 2011. 
3 Kalman Bland, The Artless Jew: Medieval and Modern Affirmations and Denials of the Visual (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2000). 
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attempts to ground contemporary Jewish art in such a previously-existing tradition: “To 
establish the reality of a Jewish visual arts, defenders usually begin with an appreciation of 
temple architecture, ornamental crafts, and illuminated manuscripts, which can be traced over 
the centuries.”4 That these are more or less the same sorts of material in which art historians 
ground the development of contemporary non-Jewish Western art does little to derail the 
religious narrative that dominates discussions of Jewish craftwork: prohibited by the second 
commandment from making art, Jews instead took up silversmithing (in areas where they 
were not prohibited from doing so by the Christian-only guild system) or else embroidery, and 
developed a rich craft tradition, of the sort extolled in museum catalogues and coffee-table 
books.  
However, this narrative does not stand up to even the most basic level of scrutiny, either 
in regards to the history of interpretation of the second commandment or in regards to the 
actual form and content of Jewish material production. The Shulchan ‘Arukh, compiled by 
Yosef Karo in 1563, provides a fairly exhaustive discussion of what sort of material 
production is permitted and what is prohibited. Unlike Talmud, which records the substance 
of halakhic debates, leaving the reader (aided, in no small part, by a lengthy interpretative 
tradition) to discern which side is ultimately correct, the Shulchan ‘Arukh aims at a clear 
presentation of the rulings governing day-to-day life, and succeeds to the extent that it still 
retains the weight of normative Orthodox practice. And the Shulchan ‘Arukh reads the second 
commandment as a blanket prohibition on all sorts of carved images, even relief (flattened) 
carving, although it permits two-dimensional depictions of everything except the complete 
human figure or the complete human face.5 A two-dimensional representation of any partial 
segment of a human figure is permissible, as are depictions of the face if it is shown in profile 
or disfigured slightly.  
This sounds restrictive enough that it might support notions of Jews as limited in their 
potential for artistic output. However, the ideas of permitted and prohibited representation, 
laid out so neatly in the Shulchan ‘Arukh, are sharply contradicted by the artefact record, 
which contains centuries of Jewish material production littered with carving, three 
dimensional images, and depictions of the complete human face and figure. In fact, many of 
these depictions can be found on precisely the sort of craftwork which Asher Lev deplored, 
                                                 
4 Russell Jacoby, Picture Imperfect: Utopian Thought for an Anti-Utopian Age (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2007), 116.  
5 Shulchan ‘Arukh 168.1–3. 
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which museums struggle to find words for, and which art historians, who wish to market 
beautiful coffee-table books to a Jewish audience, represent as a distinctively Jewish response 
to the restrictions imposed by the second commandment. For an explanation of how and why 
Jewish material production has come to be so consistently represented as a matter of craft, 
over and against art, we must look elsewhere than the second commandment and its 
interpretation. I propose that the key to understanding this distinction does not lie in religious 
text at all, but rather in the development of the concepts of art and craft themselves. 
The distinction—and the degree to which a distinction may be drawn—between art and 
craft has shifted, as the meaning of both words has changed over time. The word “art” is of 
Latin derivation, and there is thus ample room for confusion over the meaning of classical and 
medieval sources, in which ars/art is used primarily in reference to technical skill—a 
phenomenon which contemporary English usage would designate with the Germanic word 
“craft”—which originally carried, and in most other languages still carries, connotations of 
strength, power, or mastery.6 The power or mastery signalled by the term “craft” was more 
often technical (or mental) than a matter of sheer physical strength, and the word was, for 
several centuries, roughly synonymous with “art”. The art/craft divide dates to approximately 
the late 17th century, when “art” began to take on connotations of creativity and imagination; 
over time, this linguistic differentiation came to signal a sharp conceptual divide, representing 
two distinct modes of production.7  
The treatment of art and craft as distinct modes of production has typically been focused 
almost entirely on product rather than process, form rather than function. Students today are 
taught that the current division derives from the Renaissance, in which the equivalent 
distinction was between “art” and “fine art”, the latter comprising painting, sculpture, and 
architecture, and the former every other sort of material production. Paul Greenhalgh rightly 
questions the historical accuracy of this neat division, noting that “fine art as such continued 
well after the sixteenth century to routinely include other disciplines such as poetry, music, 
rhetoric and eloquence, and that the Renaissance groupings were not in any way systematic.”8 
Even in the more complicated picture drawn by Greenhalgh, one finds a vague sense that art 
or fine art is distinguished from its lesser cousin, craft (or art that is not fine art), by a certain 
                                                 
6 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “art” and s.v. “craft”. 
7 OED notes that this use did not appear in English dictionaries until the 19th century; “before then, it seems to 
have been used chiefly by painters and writers on painting.” 
8 Paul Greenhalgh, “The History of Craft”, The Culture of Craft (ed. Peter Dormer; Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1997), 26. 
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superfluity: shelter is necessary, architecture, in the sense of space designed with aesthetic 
concerns in mind, is not, and nor are paintings or sculptures meant to ornament that space; 
communication and information transfer are necessary, eloquence, rhetoric, and musicality are 
not. I will defer considering the questions raised by including works of literature or music in 
the discussion of art, not because I believe that they ought not qualify as such, but because at 
this point the distinction I am attempting to illuminate, and its historical development, is 
better understood when restricted to physical artefacts. In its simplest form, the product 
distinction does not engage with even the low level of functionalism apparent in the idea of 
superfluity; rather, an art object is simply an object which takes a form recognisable as art—
which is to say, sculpture or painting—and a craft object is an object which takes a form 
recognisable as craft—“pottery, jewellery-making, basketry, weaving, etc.”9 
However, function has become increasingly important to the definition of art. Thus, the 
philosopher R. G. Collingwood formulated a still-influential theory of art that rested primarily 
on the idea of art as a form of production which does not adhere to the criteria of craft 
production.10 This is not to say that art does not involve many of the same processes as craft, 
but the principle of superfluity comes into play. Art transcends craft; it may utilise similar 
materials and methods of production, but it engages, and elicits a response from, both the 
artist and the viewer that is incommensurate with its material origins. Art, as it is now 
understood, is a unique product of the imagination of its creator, a work of the mind as much 
if not more so than the hands; while a work of art might involve images, the goal is not to 
imitate, but to make something wholly new. Craft, by contrast, is understood to be formulaic, 
following a set plan in order to produce an object whose characteristics are pre-determined. 
This opposition is illuminated in T. R. Martland’s essay, “Art and Craft: The Distinction”, 
which, while outdated in its diction, is a fair summary of the reasoning that leads to a 
pejorative use of the word craft: 
 
They are craftsmen all, Gepettos or Kings of Cyprus, who by their actions intend to bring to 
life their own favourite Pinocchio or their own favourite Pygmalion. Along with Faust in 
Auerbach’s cellar they all intend to evoke old experiences rather than move on to new 
experiences. They all want the security of repossessing the past, to release or defend again 
what they already experience. This means none of them have room in their work for what the 
                                                 
9 Charles. B. Fethe, “Craft and Art: A Phenomenological Distinction”, British Journal of Aesthetics 17:2 (1977), 
131.  
10 See Fethe, “Craft and Art”, 129–131. 
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work itself might add. None of them want the obligation to relate to the open future. None of 
them have the intention to save themselves for what Delacroix calls “a certain abandon later 
on, for discoveries made as the work advances.”11 
Especially interesting for my purposes are the examples of craft that Martland selects: 
Pinocchio, Pygmalion.12 According to Martland, the desire to imbue the object with life and 
then dwell with the companion of one’s own creation is a flight from originality, from the risk 
and unpredictability entailed by relationship with something outside of one’s own sphere of 
control. In striving to bring the work to life, he suggests, Gepetto and Pygmalion 
paradoxically rob the work of the capability to transform itself or its creator. They seek to 
avoid a lengthy engagement with work qua work. By transforming the object they 
manufacture into something other than what it is, by using the process of manufacture as a 
means rather than an end in itself, they produce variations on what already exists, rather than 
creating any new value. They bring the work into their world, rather than entering into the 
world of the work. In so doing, they control everything, and risk nothing. What Gepetto and 
Pygmalion seek to create, according to Martland, is reproduction, imitation—not art.  
Craft, then, is understood to be formulaic. A craftsperson does not even need to have 
designed the thing they make —they just blindly implement someone else’s idea, following a 
set plan in order to produce an object whose characteristics are pre-determined—over, and 
over, and over again. A narrative that glorifies the transcendent nature of art while restricting 
Jewish material production to the realm of craft echoes and re-enforces the anti-Semitic trope 
of Jews as cultural scavengers, incapable of producing cultural value on their own.  
At the same time, the history of Jewish exclusion from the medieval craft guilds of 
Europe led, in an attempt to prove that such exclusion was not logical or natural, to a 
valorization of craftwork within the Jewish community. Cultural history written by Jews, for 
Jews, places a great emphasis on craft traditions from the Mediterranean region, which 
flourished under Islamic rule, as well as on the Jewish guild system that formed relatively 
late—between the 16th and 18th centuries—in Eastern Europe.13 Jewish cultural history 
                                                 
11 Thomas. R. Martland, “Art and Craft: The Distinction”, British Journal of Aesthetics 14:3 (1974), 236.  
12 One must assume that Martland was preoccupied with the æsthetic effect of alliteration and neglected to note 
that Pygmalion and the King of Cyprus are the same person, and the statue with which he fell in love came to be 
named Galatea; nevertheless, the myth which he references remains recognisable, and the trope of made objects 
coming to life is clearly discernible. 
13 See, e.g., Tudor Parfitt, The Road to Redemption: The Jews of Yemen, 1900–1950 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 118–
120; Michael Menachem Laskier & Reeva Spector Simon, “Economic Life”, The Jews of the Middle-East and 
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written with the goal of demonstrating the European-ness of Jews, by emphasizing their own 
craft history, in common with the guild-dominated society of the middle ages, actually served, 
by restricting the history of Jewish material production solely to the realm of craft, to 
underline the Jewish community’s religious otherness as Romantic-era ideas about the 
uniqueness of the work of art and the individual genius of the artist took hold.  
And so the narrative that emphasises Jewish craftwork over and against Jewish artistic 
production is enforced, albeit for different reasons, from both inside and outside of the Jewish 
community. Asher Lev is initially discouraged from embarking on an artistic career by his 
mentor, Jacob Kahn, who warns him that fine art (which he differentiates from the painting of 
portraits, “calendars for matzo companies” and “Rosh Hashonoh greeting cards”) 
 
… is a tradition of goyim and pagans. Its values are goyisch and pagan. Its concepts are 
goyisch and pagan. In the entire history of European art, there has not been a single religious 
Jew who was a great painter.14 
Indeed, Jacob’s discouraging speech to Asher occupies three full paragraphs, which mirrors 
the tradition of Orthodox rabbis turning away potential converts three times before agreeing to 
accept them for instruction. This structure serves to emphasize what Jacob’s words already 
warn: in studying not merely painting-as-a-representative-craft (portraits and calendars and 
greeting cards) but painting as an art form, Asher is not making a simple choice of vocation, 
but an alteration in worldview that amounts to nothing short of religious conversion. He will 
learn to see and inhabit the world in a manner entirely different from the rest of his 
community, and once he begins, he cannot un-learn; there can be no going back. But by the 
time Jacob issues his warning, it is too late; Potok has already spent more than half the book 
impressing the reader with Asher’s inescapable compulsion to not just paint, but to make art. 
Nobody—not Potok, not Jacob, not the reader—expects Asher to back down, and, indeed, 
everyone—including, and perhaps especially, Potok himself—would be disappointed if he did 
realize that he could make a perfectly good living illustrating calendars and greeting cards, 
                                                                                                                                                        
Africa in Modern Times (eds. Reeva Spector Simon, Michael Melchior Laskier & Sara Regeur; New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2003), 30–34; Dalia Manor, “Orientalism and Jewish National Art: The Case of 
Bezalel”, Orientalism and the Jews (eds. Ivan D. Kalmar & Derek J Penslar; Waltham: Brandeis University 
Press, 2004), 147; Jacob R. Marcus, The Jew in the Medieval World: A Source Book 315–1791, with an 
Introduction and Updated Bibliographies by Marc Saperstein (Detroit: Hebrew Union College Press, 2000), 
508. 
14 Potok, My Name is Asher Lev, 186. 
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without ever needing to come into conflict with the religious values of his community. We 
would feel not only cheated by the story, but also that Asher had cheated himself, had settled 
not just for the lesser of two evils, but simply for less.  
The lack of creativity which constitutes the now taken for granted distinction between 
art and craft also guarantees that craft is viewed by Jews and non-Jews alike as an acceptable 
form of Jewish material production; it threatens neither European cultural superiority nor 
religious values which reserve true acts of creation for God alone. But it is precisely this 
failure to challenge the status quo which renders insufficient any attempt to valorize the 
history of Jewish material production while at the same time maintaining a distinction 
between Jewish and non-Jewish forms of making. The Israel Museum’s flirtation with the 
category of “ritual art” or “ceremonial artworks” for the sorts of objects which Asher Lev 
finds “unmoving” is a perfect example of this: the meta-categories of “art” and “craft” are by 
now too well-established for such rhetorical shuffling to be convincing; even publications and 
museum displays which promote the category of “ritual art” on the surface slip frequently into 
the language of craftsmanship.15 While such slippage is in part a legacy of the shifts in 
meaning between art and craft, it also serves to re-enforce the exclusion of Jewish material 
production from the category of “real” art; it reveals the attempted rhetorical sleight-of-hand 
behind the category of ritual or ceremonial art as not even fully convincing to its proponents, 
much less to skeptics, like Asher Lev, steeped in a cultural tradition which glorifies fine art 
over and above all other forms of material production. 
This leaves Jewish material production in a difficult double bind: if fine art is a tradition 
of goyim and pagans, and also the only tradition which truly matters, then Jewish culture will 
always be something not just other, but lesser. What is needed—what invented categories 
such as “ritual art” fail to achieve—is not so much a promotion of the status of craft, but a 
wholesale critique of the cultural hierarchy of value which creates the double bind in the first 
place. Such a critique may have been partially attempted by the early Bezalel School, though 
ultimately its emphasis on Jewishness over and above any other metrics of aesthetic or 
practical value steered it away from a head-on confrontation with the world of European art, 
and ensured that the reception of its distinctive style would be governed by the art/craft 
valuation prevalent elsewhere in the world, regardless of what influence such categories 
                                                 
15 These categories are also very popular in publications on Jewish material production; see, e.g., Michael E. 
Keen, Jewish Ritual Art in the Victoria & Albert Museum (London: HMSO, 1991); also the classic Cecil Roth, 
Jewish Art: An Illustrated History (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961). 
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actually had on production at the School.16 A more fruitful possibility for the re-valuation of 
Jewish material production lies in the feminist project of rescuing and elevating forms of 
work which are commonly dismissed as the traditional domain of women; most textile work 
falls into this category, and the theory developed in reference to primarily domestic forms of 
making can be expanded more widely to include other forms of practical objects, such as the 
ritual cups and candlesticks which comprise the greater part of most museum collections of 
Jewish artefacts.17 But this is work which remains to be done; at present, I hope I have at least 
contributed to a more precise articulation of the problem. 
 
                                                 
16 For an overview of the genesis of the Bezalel School, see Nurit Shilo Cohen, “The ‘Hebrew Style’ of Bezalel”, 
The Journal of Decorative and Propaganda Arts 20 (1994), 140–163; while Cohen seems to take the separation 
of art and craft at the School for granted, he at the same time provides evidence that the curriculum itself was 
aimed at forcing a greater integration of the two than existed at other academies at the time (or, for the most part, 
in the present day). 
17 For an overview of the growing field of feminist aesthetics and its critique of the art/craft dichotomy, see 
Carolyn Korsmeyer, Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2004). 
